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Assistant Director, O/RR

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Chief, Economic Services Division

Communications Branch, Economic Services Division

1. The Office of Research and Reports, recognizing the need for adequate coverage of foreign communications networks, the uses of individual types of services, their importance to economic and military efforts, and the implications of such uses as they may affect the security of the US, has established a Communications Branch in the Economic Services Division.

2. The responsibility of this branch should encompass radio, telephone, telegraph, radar, television, mail or other communications systems with particular emphasis upon operational factors in the Soviet orbit.

3. It is our understanding that the responsibility for research and reporting on production of communications equipment rests with the Industrial Division and that responsibility for scientific research and inventions in communications equipment rests with O/I.

4. It was deemed proper in the course of organizing a Communications Branch to ascertain what activities might have been conducted by other CIA offices or government agencies.

5. We have learned from O/I in a preliminary search for sources of information that it claims jurisdiction of the entire communications operations field though its functions were confined to research of a scientific nature. The reasons advanced to justify the retaining of the operations functions was that: (1) it has a communications specialist; (2) it is endeavoring to assemble a staff; and (3) the Signal Corps prefers to cooperate with its personnel.

6. We shall, in accordance with the responsibilities assigned to us, continue our efforts to properly staff a Communications Branch to report on the operational functions of communications systems. If O/SI has one or two competent specialists devoting all their time to operational functions and who prefer to work in that field, they possibly should be transferred to O/RR, D-6, thus meeting the objections advanced against the establishment of the Communications Branch in D-6.

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THE ANALYSIS OF DATA ON COMMUNICATIONS

Prior to the recent reorganization, Central Intelligence Agency did little work on the communications facilities of foreign countries and the employment thereof, due to lack of personnel to handle the additional work load which this would entail. The reorganization provided for the establishment of a Communications Branch in O/RR to prepare studies of the various foreign communications networks, the uses made of the systems, the importance to foreign economic and military efforts, and the military and economic implications of foreign communications policy in relation to the interests and security of the United States. It was directed that attention be given to radio, telephone, telegraph, cable, radar, television, mail and other communication systems of the world, with particular emphasis on the Soviet Orbit. Analyses and reports were to be directed to operational factors, and the broad aspects of communications employment and policy.

Responsibility for research on production of communications equipment was vested in another Branch of O/RR, now in process of organization. Responsibility for studies of scientific research and invention in communications equipment is vested in O/SI, where personnel to handle this is already partly recruited.

When attempt was made to set up the Communications Branch of O/RR, it was found that the newly established communications group in O/SI claimed jurisdiction over the whole operations field, on the basis that the Chief of the group had close contacts with the Signal Corps and would be able to work well with them. It was acknowledged that O/SI was supposed to confine itself to scientific research on equipment, but it was claimed that since O/SI had personnel with considerable experience in communications, while O/RR would have to acquire this personnel, that O/SI should take over the field. Curiously enough, although a desire to handle construction of equipment was also voiced, no strong attempt has been made to prevent establishment by O/RR of a Branch to work in this field, although construction of equipment is far closer to research on equipment, than is the operation of communications networks and the military and economic implications thereof.

This brings up a matter of basic policy. In any large organization, operation on a personal basis soon leads to chaos and constant bickering, with various office barons continually seeking to extend their dominions by war and intrigue. It is the policy of CIA to issue clearcut instructions delimiting the fields of the various Offices, and of their Divisions and Branches, so that all may know the extent of the field they are to cover, and what is the responsibility of others in related areas. Those divisions of function are not lightly to be set aside on the unilateral claim that special contacts or special competence--both highly subjective matters--excuse an invasion of areas entrusted to others. Instead, if it is determined that such special contacts or special competence makes a man more valuable in a field other than that entrusted to him, it is the duty of his chiefs to arrange his transfer to the Office handling this work. This is the policy which should be followed in the present case.

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If it is felt that Mr. [REDACTED] will be more valuable in studying the operations of communications networks, and the economic and military implications thereof, than he will in reporting scientific research on communications equipment, he should be transferred to the new field. If he feels greater competence and interest in research, he should remain with O/SI and handle this subject. Liaison with other Branches on fields of common interest is always easily arranged, and will be welcomed by us.

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It has been claimed that it will be easier for Mr. [REDACTED] to get communications data from Signal Corps than it will for any one else in CIA, and that this justifies giving him jurisdiction over communications operations. To the extent that this claim is correct, it is: (1) an argument for his transfer to O/RR, and (2) an indictment of Signal Corps as placing personal relationships above the mandate of the law establishing CIA as the central coordinating office for intelligence data, and directing the IAC agencies to cooperate therewith. Cooperation must be agency with agency, and it is not thought for a minute that any group in Army, Navy or elsewhere will refuse to deal with CIA because some one particular person is not the channel for certain data. We must not be hedged off from any proper contact by any personal claim to the position of exclusive agent for outside information. To permit this is to give persons in other agencies a veto power over CIA operations, through the building up of favored or exclusive channels for data and reports, with matters so arranged that such data will go only to those agreeing in policy with the supplier, or else known to be inert or easily swayed. That practice has been worked before, and is one reason why CIA was set up, and given authority to coordinate intelligence work.

To recapitulate, a claim to handle communications operations and to prepare economic analyses in this field is advanced by O/SI representatives on the basis that: (1) O/SI is already in de facto possession, since it has a communications expert, and has begun to assemble a staff; (2) the expert has special competence; (3) the expert has special relations with Signal Corps, and the latter will prefer to deal with him, and he can then supply O/RR with whatever the latter needs in the communications field. As regards the first point, a lead of a few weeks confers no right, and the jurisdictional trespass on O/RR is clear and acknowledged by O/SI. The second is a valid point, and if O/SI chooses to maintain it, it should be prepared to recommend transfer of Mr. [REDACTED] or any others handling operational data and analysis, to O/RR, which controls operational data and analysis in every other economic field, and has been assigned exclusive control in that of communications. To do otherwise is to make assignment of function meaningless, and to invite claims by others. It happens, for example, that Mr. [REDACTED], who has been assigned as Chief of the Communications Branch, O/RR, has competence in certain fields assigned to O/SI. He has made a number of inventions in chemistry and metallurgy. Does this give him a right to insist that O/SI channel all its research work in these subjects through him? The third point—that of special exclusive contacts—is, bluntly, a plea for the setting up of a special bottleneck.

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Should O/SI continue to maintain its right to possession of the communications operations field, it must be prepared to furnish all data desired by O/RR, and to prepare authoritative analyses and forecasts from such data. This does not mean that it will merely seek data and opinions

from other government departments, for transmittal, but that it shall be the center for analysis. Radio, telephone, telegraph, cable, radar, television, and mail, are the fields of major interest, and in these fields we will need the following information:

1. Full data on the communications network, as to location of facilities, hours of operation, wavelengths and power (where applicable), types of facilities, efficiency, staff, interruptions to service, priority of messages, use of code, alternative message routes, seasonal changes in operations, new construction planned and in progress, changes in the network since 1947, source of power etc.
2. Equipment used in the networks, types, amounts, sources of supply, prospective changes, weaknesses, repair facilities, etc.
3. Governmental policy on communications, agencies controlling this, attitude toward communications policies of foreign nations, jamming of broadcasts, restrictions on radio sets, censorship, monitoring, etc.
4. Data on the nature and volume of messages sent, and estimates of the importance to the foreign military and economic effort. To what degree are the messages interceptable and intercepted. Security Consciousness?
5. Degree to which communications requirements are met by existing and planned facilities. Computations as to demand in time of war, and effects on the economy of inadequate service per se, or inadequacy induced by military attack. Centralization of economic decision in the capital.
6. Summation of the strengths and weaknesses of foreign communications networks and communications policies, and their bearing on the interests of the United States. Views of our allies on these matters.
7. Vulnerabilities.

It is of course not enough that O/SI be prepared to furnish some of the above data on some types of communications. It must handle all, or it should not move outside its assigned field. If it handles all, the personnel required will certainly outnumber those dealing with the purely research aspects of communications, and the Branch will then more appropriately be located in O/KR.